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UNCOMFORTABLY NUMB: THE THIRD CIRCUIT CHECKS STATE’S
FORCED MEDICATION POLICY IN DISABILITY RIGHTS
NEW JERSEY v. COMMISSIONER, NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
MICHAEL WALKER*
“And if the band you’re in starts playing different tunes, I’ll see you on
the dark side of the moon.”1
I. HAVE A CIGAR . . . WHILE ADDRESSING QUESTIONS SURROUNDING
THE TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PATIENTS
In 1935, a Portuguese doctor named Antonio Egas Moniz performed
the first prefrontal leukotomy operation, also known as a lobotomy.2  This
revolutionary procedure, which became popular in the United States in
the 1930s to the 1950s, was executed by shocking the patient into a coma
and hammering an icepick-like instrument through the top of each eye
socket, thus severing the nerves connected to the emotional sensors of the
brain.3  Often, lobotomies were administered whether or not the patient
consented.4  Despite the brutality of this procedure, doctors saw it as a
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2015, University of Scranton.  I would like to thank my family and friends,
especially Nina Luciani, for all their continued support and advice.  I would also
like to thank Stephen Caggiano and the editors of VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW for their
diligent feedback and suggestions for this Casebrief.
1. PINK FLOYD, Brain Damage, (Capitol Records 1973).  This is a vague lyric
that many have attempted to interpret over the years. See PHIL ROSE, ROGER WA-
TERS AND PINK FLOYD: THE CONCEPT ALBUMS 37–38 (2015).  However, according to
Roger Waters, the line
‘I’ll see you on the dark side of the moon’ is me speaking to the listener
saying: I know you have these bad feelings and impulses because I do too
and one of the ways I can make direct contact with you is to share with
you the fact that I feel bad sometimes.
Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted).  “The dark side of the moon” seems to represent the
insane side of all of us as people, and Waters saying he will see us there means he
identifies with that side of us in himself. See id.  In that way, we can all identify with
what we commonly refer to as “insanity.”
2. See Brengt Jansson, Controversial Psychosurgery Resulted in a Nobel Prize, NOBEL-
PRIZE.ORG (Oct. 29, 1998), https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/
laureates/1949/moniz-article.html [https://perma.cc/LH5F-DMW] (discussing
research that led to Moniz’s Nobel Prize in 1949).
3. See Allison M. Foerschner, The History of Mental Illness: From Skull Drills to
Happy Pills, 2 INQUIRIES J. no.9, 2010, at 1, 4 (discussing history of mental illness
treatment and lobotomies).
4. See Elizabeth Day, He Was Bad, So They Put an Icepick in His Brain . . ., GUARD-
IAN (Jan. 13, 2008, 6:40 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2008/jan/
13/ neuroscience.medicalscience [https://perma.cc/9ZE3-PWJF] (stating “[h]e
had undergone a lobotomy and no one, not his parents, not the medical commu-
(581)
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successful way to calm uncontrollably violent and emotional patients to
enhance their standard of living.5  The procedure proved to be something
of a revolution for the medical field, and Moniz was even awarded the
1949 Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine for his work on lobotomies.6
Medical practices, specifically the treatment of mentally ill patients,
have come a long way since the days of the last lobotomy.7  The process as
a whole was abandoned in favor of the application of psychoactive drugs.8
Today, medication is overwhelmingly the most popular way to treat mental
illness in the United States.9  Odds are, we all know at least one person
who has been diagnosed with some form of mental illness or disorder and
has been prescribed some form of medication, such as Xanax or Adderall,
to name a couple of the more common ones.10  But while medication and
other treatments such as counseling have been widely adopted, courts con-
tinue to take on constitutional and other legal questions such as, “is con-
sent always required to medicate mentally ill patients?” and, “if consent is
not always required, what kinds of patients can be forcibly medicated?”11
Courts hold that, while a patient’s constitutional rights play a role in decid-
nity or the state authorities, had intervened to stop it,” and noting he had under-
gone operation “without his knowledge”).  The article goes on to mention the
story of Rose Kennedy, sister of John F. Kennedy, who also underwent a lobotomy
when she was twenty-three years old for which only her father’s consent was given.
See id.
5. See Foerschner, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing perceived value of lobotomies
to medical professionals).
6. See Jansson, supra note 2 (discussing Nobel Prize Moniz was awarded for his
work in lobotomies).
7. See Foerschner, supra note 3, at 4 (“Although significant advances have
been made in this field of study that greatly benefit many individuals suffering
from psychopathology, there remains much room for improvement.”).
8. See id. (stating lobotomies were “quickly abandoned” for drug treatment).
9. See Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dept. of Human Servs., 796
F.3d 293, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting witness testimony that “ ‘psychotropic
medications are almost universally a part of successful treatment for patients in
psychiatric hospitals’”); see also Treatments for Mental Disorders, SUBSTANCE ABUSE &
MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/treatment/mental-disor-
ders [https://perma.cc/E4G2-GJQJ] (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (discussing how
many common mental illnesses are treated with medication including anxiety, de-
pression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”)).
10. See Treatments for Mental Disorders, supra note 9 (“43.6 million adults ages 18
and older experienced some form of mental illness in the past year, or about
18.1% of the adult population.”); see also Drugs & Medications: Adderall, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-63163/adderall-oral/details [https://per
ma.cc/2T3J-WWG9] (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (describing uses of Adderall);
Drugs & Medications: Xanax, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-
9824/xanax-oral/details [https://perma.cc/67Q3-2482] (last visited Mar. 10,
2017) (describing uses of Xanax).
11. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 294 (addressing issue of whether mentally
ill patients can be forcibly medicated in non-emergency situations without judicial
process); see also Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 848–49 (3d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter
Rennie I] (addressing issue of whether civilly committed patients can be forcibly
medicated).
2
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ing to medicate, a patient’s consent is not always required.12  However,
there is no uniform judicial standard for who can be forcibly medicated
and under what circumstances that forced medication can take place.13
In 2015, the Third Circuit addressed that precise issue in Disability
Rights New Jersey, Inc. v. Commissioner of New Jersey Department of Human Ser-
vices.14  In Disability Rights, a New Jersey policy that allowed state-run
mental hospitals to forcibly medicate certain patients once procedural re-
quirements were met was challenged on multiple grounds by a national
nonprofit organization.15 Disability Rights was the second Third Circuit de-
cision to address constitutional challenges to a state policy on the forced
medication of mental patients in the civil, rather than the prison,
context.16
Opinions on Disability Rights’ outcome will likely differ depending on
the association of the medical professional, attorney, or policy maker.17
In the more specific context of medicating the mentally ill, this opinion
established that some patients could be forcibly medicated in some situa-
tions, while others cannot be forcibly medicated at all.18  However, Disabil-
12. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (holding suffi-
cient due process for forced medication of mentally ill state prisoner existed).
13. See, e.g., Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 310 (finding conditional extension
pending placement (CEPP) patients cannot be forcibly medicated under New
Jersey policy); Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 209 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1320 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (finding “antipsychotic drugs cannot be administered to involuntarily
committed patients in non-emergency situations without their informed consent”).
There is no single, uniform judicial standard for addressing forced medication
policies in the civil context namely because few courts have addressed them and
the Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue.  For further discussion, see infra
notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
14. 796 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2015); see id. at 294 (stating issue at hand was
“whether mentally ill residents of New Jersey who have been committed to state
custody are entitled to judicial process before they may be forcibly medicated in
non-emergency situations”).
15. See id. at 296 (discussing facts and parties to case).
16. See id. (“Unlike the Supreme Court, we have squarely addressed the right
of civilly committed psychiatric patients to refuse psychotropic drugs.”); see also
Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 267–68 (3d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Rennie II] (re-
examining ruling in Rennie I on forced medication policy); Rennie I, 653 F.2d 836,
848 (3d Cir. 1981) (addressing constitutional challenges to New Jersey policy on
forced medication of mentally ill).
17. See Fahad Ali & Kenneth J. Weiss, The State Cannot Force Medications on
Committed Patients Who Are No Longer Considered Dangerous, 44 LEGAL DIG. 259, 261
(2016) (expressing general agreement with Third Circuit’s ruling in Disability
Rights).  Of course, the underlying principle of the court’s reasoning—that they
prefer to trust the opinions of medical professionals over those of lawmakers—
weighs heavily in favor of the state and parties that will be in like positions in cases
in the future. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 310 (“[W]hile judges have an impor-
tant role to play in the civil commitment process, matters of medical treatment are
more appropriately handled by medical professionals.”).
18. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 310 (finding patients with CEPP status can-
not be forcibly medicated unless reevaluated via judicial proceeding and found to
be dangerous).  Conditional extension pending placement (CEPP) status, which
will be discussed further in this Casebrief, essentially means that the patient has
3
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ity Rights also established that the Third Circuit will generally defer to the
opinions of medical professionals rather than those of judges and other
lawmakers.19
This Casebrief offers advice to both civil rights and health law attor-
neys in the Third Circuit on how to address forced medication and similar
medical claims from the perspective of both medical practitioners and pa-
tients.20  Part II discusses the history of medication of the mentally ill and
the development of policy for the forcible medication of civilly committed
mental patients.21  Part III discusses both the background and the court’s
analysis in Disability Rights.22  Part IV addresses the court’s rationale in Dis-
ability Rights.23  Additionally, Part IV also provides advice to practitioners
on both sides of the docket about how to effectively represent their cli-
ents.24  Part V concludes this Casebrief by stressing the key takeaways of
Disability Rights and how its holding can help both medical practitioners
and mental patients alike.25
II. ALAN’S PSYCHEDELIC BREAKFAST: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT AND POLICY
Civilization has debated the proper methods to treat mentally ill pa-
tients for centuries.26  The methods employed have ranged from locking
the mentally ill away to administering lobotomies.27  In the modern era,
medication has been the preferred means to treat the mentally ill either
been deemed not dangerous as a matter of law and only remains in the hospital on
a temporary basis as the patient awaits relocation for different treatment. See id. at
294–95.  Since patients on CEPP status are by definition not dangerous, they can-
not be forcibly medicated so long as they maintain that status. See id. at 310.
19. See id. at 310 (“[W]hile judges have an important role to play in the civil
commitment process, matters of medical treatment are more appropriately han-
dled by medical professionals.  We conclude that the State’s approach comports
with the demands of the Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities
Act . . . .”).
20. See infra notes 115–33 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 26–68 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 69–108 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 109–33 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 109–33 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
26. See Foerschner, supra note 3, at 1 (“Attempts to treat mental illness date
back as early as 5000 BCE.”).
27. See id. at 1–4 (discussing many treatments historically used to treat mental
illness).  The methods varied among geographic regions, time periods, and cul-
tures. See id. at 1–6 (discussing treatment methods used).  During classical antiq-
uity in Mesopotamia, people with mental illness were treated with religious and
magic ceremonies that were believed to perform some sort of exorcism on the
demons that supposedly resided in the individual. See id. at 1.  In a seemingly
forward-looking effort, the ancient Egyptians engaged their mentally ill in activities
such as painting and dancing to return them to a sense of normalcy. See id.
4
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with or without their consent.28  The administration of antipsychotic med-
ication became mainstream when it was introduced during the 1950s be-
cause it created a simpler, more humane mode of treating the mentally
ill.29  Even though antipsychotic medication helps to alleviate the major
disruptive symptoms of mental illness, it can have equally disruptive and
harsh side effects for the person taking it.30  More philosophically, every
person in the United States is entitled to autonomy and the right to
choose what does or does not go into their own body.31  As a result, a
number of issues have arisen over the years concerning the administration
of antipsychotic medications in both the criminal and civil context.32  Spe-
cifically, the issue is whether forced or involuntary administration conflicts
with concepts of due process, the right to privacy, the right to refuse treat-
ment, informed consent, and medical ethics.33
Policies of the last few decades that led to the discharge of a large
portion of the civilian psychiatric population have, in turn, increased the
population of mentally ill persons in prisons.34  As a result, there has been
28. See Mary C. McCarron, Comment, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs:
Safeguarding the Mentally Incompetent Patient’s Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ.
L. REV. 477, 480–85 (1990) (discussing history of medication for treatment of men-
tally ill).
29. See id. at 480 (discussing introduction of medication to treat mental
illness).
30. See id. at 477 (discussing nature of antipsychotic medication).  Ultimately,
side effects are numerous and could be either temporary or permanent. See id. at
482.  Examples of temporary side effects include akathisia (restlessness or agita-
tion), dystonia (muscle contractions), and Parkinsonian syndrome (has a number
of “the same symptoms of Parkinson’s disease” but is different because it is tempo-
rary), all of which stop when the medication is discontinued. See id. at 482, 482
nn.30–32 (discussing side effects of antipsychotic medication).  Examples of com-
mon, permanent side effects are tardive dyskinesia, a permanent “disorder charac-
terized by involuntary” spasms in the face and mouth muscles that is untreatable,
and neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which is fatal in 30% of cases. See Washing-
ton v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 239–40 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing
neuroleptic malignant syndrome); McCarron, supra note 28, at 482 n.35 (discuss-
ing tardive dyskinesia).  McCarron also writes that “[i]t is apparent that antip-
sychotic drugs produce effects that are independent of the volition of the patient
and in this respect can be labeled intrusive.” See McCarron, supra note 28, at
482–83.
31. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating in-
formed consent doctrine rooted in “concept, fundamental in American jurispru-
dence, that ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body’” (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y
of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914))).
32. See Chuck Weller, Forced Administration of Antipsychotic Drugs to Civilly Com-
mitted Mental Patients in Nevada: A Remedy Without a Clear Statutory Authorization, 11
NEV. L.J. 759, 759–60 (2011) (discussing legal and medical hurdles to involuntary
medication).
33. See id. at 763–64 (discussing hurdles that policies of forced medication
face).
34. See Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their Incar-
ceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 157, 157–58
(2000) (discussing implications of large mentally-ill population in United States
5
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an increase in litigation about medicating the mentally ill within the
United States prison system.35  The benchmark case on this topic is Wash-
ington v. Harper.36  In that case, Harper argued that if he was going to be
forced to take the medication, he was at least entitled to a judicial hearing
prior to its administration.37  The Supreme Court, however, held
that the regulation before us is permissible under the Constitu-
tion.  It is an accommodation between an inmate’s liberty inter-
est in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs
and the State’s interests in providing appropriate medical treat-
ment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a seri-
ous mental disorder represents to himself or others.38
The Court also reasoned that the administrative hearing process that
was used to determine whether Harper should be forcibly medicated was
constitutional.39  Though Harper was set in the criminal rather than the
civil context, it is frequently cited by courts that are adjudicating forced
medication cases in the civil context.40
prison system).  In his article, Stavis writes that the large volume of discharges over
the past thirty years can be generally attributed to the discovery of psychotropic
medications as well as “economic and bureaucratic influences.” See id. at 158 (dis-
cussing implementation of psychotropic medications’ impact on society).  He goes
on to assert that this “dehospitalization was either premature or poorly executed
because formerly hospitalized patients are increasingly and often needlessly be-
coming prisoners.” See id.
35. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 186 (2003) (holding defendant
could be involuntarily medicated in order to obtain competence to stand trial);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (holding prisoners could be forci-
bly medicated if mentally ill and posed danger to self or others); United States v.
Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 384 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding state had interest in forcibly medi-
cating defendant to ensure his competence for trial); United States v. Baldovinos,
434 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding defendant could be involuntarily medi-
cated in order to stand trial); Dancy v. Simms, 116 F. Supp. 2d 652, 656–58 (D. Md.
2000) (holding involuntary medication of defendant did not violate due process).
36. 494 U.S. 210 (1990); see Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dept. of
Human Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2015) (referring to Harper as “the most
relevant of these cases for our purposes”).  In Harper, a mentally ill man who had
been in and out of prison for fourteen years for a robbery conviction challenged a
Washington state policy that forced him to take antipsychotic medication. See
Harper, 494 U.S. at 210.  The policy in question stated that an inmate could be
involuntarily medicated if the inmate had a “mental disorder” and the inmate
posed a “likelihood of serious harm” to himself and others. See id.
37. See id. (discussing facts of case).  Eventually, the plaintiff in Disability Rights
would argue the same: if the patients were going to be forcibly medicated, they
were entitled to a judicial hearing on the matter. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at
297 (discussing Disability Rights New Jersey’s argument and remedy sought).
38. Harper, 494 U.S. at 236.
39. See id. (finding Washington policy did not violate Constitution’s Due Pro-
cess Clause).
40. See, e.g., Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 296 (“Harper [is] the most relevant of
these cases for our purposes . . . .”); Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506,
510–11 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that Harper adopted balancing test between
prison inmate’s liberty interest and state’s interest in public health and safety).
6
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Turning to the civil side, psychiatric facilities in the United States in-
voluntarily hold and treat more than 1,000,000 patients annually.41
Around 2010, the year Disability Rights New Jersey brought its initial suit
against New Jersey, state and private psychiatric hospitals in the state
housed roughly 2,800 patients in five facilities.42  Relying in part on cases
such as Harper, courts have historically held that civilly committed mental
health patients can be forcibly medicated for a certain amount of time
provided certain procedural requirements are met.43  Still, irrespective of
those certain procedural requirements, forced medication depends on the
medical status of the civilian patient.44  In New Jersey, this status could be
either conditional extension pending placement (CEPP) or non-CEPP.45
CEPP status means that the patient is deemed “not dangerous” (either by
the hospital or by judicial review) and that the individual only remains in
the state hospital for the amount of time necessary to be relocated to “ap-
propriate placement.”46  These patients may not be forcibly medicated ex-
cept under the emergency provisions of various state policies, such as New
Jersey’s.47  Non-CEPP status means that the patient is not given a “not dan-
41. See William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappro-
priate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L.
REV. 259, 261 (2010) (discussing impact of civil commitment process on mentally
ill population). See generally John A. Menninger, Involuntary Treatment: Hospitaliza-
tion and Medications, BROWN UNIV.: DEP’T OF PSYCHIATRY, https://www.brown.edu/
Courses/BI_278/Other/Clerkship/Didactics/Readings/INVOLUNTARY%20
TREATMENT.pdf [https://perma.cc/43ST-2B3T] (last visited, August 2, 2017)
(identifying medical and legal basis for institutionalization).
42. See Richard Perez-Pena, New Jersey Is Sued over the Forced Medication of Pa-
tients at Psychiatric Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/08/04/health/policy/04psych.html (“There are about 1,800 patients at any
given time in New Jersey’s five state psychiatric hospitals, and 1,000 in private
ones.”).
43. See, e.g., Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 308 (holding portion of New Jersey
policy that forcibly medicates non-CEPP patients is constitutional).  The Third Cir-
cuit likely upheld that portion of New Jersey’s policy because it was a comprehen-
sive, multi-step process that has a number of safeguards, including (1) mandatory
reports describing the diagnosis, treatment plan, and reason as to why “patient
satisfies the substantive standard”; (2) meeting by an objective panel of doctors
who are not involved in the patient’s care; and (3) the right of the patient “to
appeal the panel’s decision.” See id. at 298–99 (discussing steps of New Jersey pol-
icy); see also infra notes 57–68 and accompanying text for description of the Rennie
Process.
44. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 307–10 (discussing why non-CEPP patients
can be forcibly medicated while CEPP patients cannot).
45. See id. at 295, 307–10 (discussing differences between CEPP and non-
CEPP status, and finding CEPP patients could not be forcibly medicated so long as
they maintained that status).
46. See id. at 295 (“Patients on CEPP status remain in the hospital only be-
cause an appropriate alternative placement is unavailable; their status is reviewed
within 60 days of the CEPP order’s issuance and then periodically at intervals no
longer than six months.”); Ali & Weiss, supra note 17, at 259 (discussing definition
of CEPP status).
47. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 300 (agreeing with lower court’s finding
that “[CEPP] patients have already been found by a court of law not to be danger-
7
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gerous” status and that the individual remains in the hospital for further
treatment.48  Non-CEPP patients can be forcibly medicated in any situa-
tion (emergency or non-emergency) provided certain medical procedures
are met.49
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the standards for policies man-
dating the medication of patients who bring a civil suit.50  Nevertheless, in
addition to Harper, the Supreme Court heard another case that is vital to
analysis in forced medication cases: Mathews v. Eldridge.51  In Mathews, the
plaintiff’s disability benefits from the Social Security Administration were
terminated.52  The plaintiff argued that before the Administration could
cancel his benefits, some form of judicial hearing had to be held to deter-
mine whether he could receive a continuation on the benefits.53  The
Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to such a hearing based on
the balancing of three factors: (1) “private interests [affected by] the offi-
cial action,” (2) “the risk of . . . deprivation” of interest “through the pro-
cedures used,” and (3) the “government’s interest.”54  This test was used
to determine the issues in Harper and was significantly relied on by the
Third Circuit in Disability Rights.55
ous, and any ‘volatility’ or relapse into dangerousness could be addressed using the
emergency provisions of AB 5:04A or the recommitment process”).
48. See id. (stating non-CEPP “treatment is not based on disability, but based
on a finding of dangerousness” (quoting Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Velez, 974 F.
Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D.N.J. 2013))).  By definition, non-CEPP is the opposite of
CEPP. See id.
49. See id. at 310 (holding New Jersey’s “approach [to non-CEPP patients]
comports with the demands of the Constitution and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, except as to CEPP patients”).
50. See id. at 296 (“The Supreme Court has never decided whether civilly com-
mitted individuals have a constitutional right to refuse psychotropic drugs.”).
Again, though the Court has addressed forced medication in prisons, as a general
matter, it has never explicitly addressed its application to the civil context. See id.
(noting that court never addressed forced medication in civil context).
51. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–31
(1990) (using Mathews’s balancing test to determine decision to medicate Harper
was best left to medical professionals); Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 309 (using Ma-
thews to analyze procedural due process rights in forced medication claim).
52. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324 (discussing facts of case).
53. See id. at 324–25 (discussing plaintiff’s argument).
54. See id. at 335 (promulgating three step balancing test for procedural due
process claims).  The exact test was that the court addressing the claim should
consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
55. See Harper 494 U.S. 229–31 (using Mathews’s balancing test to determine
decision to medicate Harper was best left to medical professionals); Disability
8
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Five years after Mathews, the Third Circuit directly addressed the ques-
tion of forced medication in the civil context in Rennie v. Klein (Rennie I)56
and Rennie v. Klein (Rennie II).57  In Rennie I, the Third Circuit found that
a civilly committed patient did have the “qualified constitutional right to
refuse antipsychotic medication,” but that a patient’s decision to refuse
the medication could be overridden by a process that became known as
the “Rennie Process.”58  Though the Supreme Court ordered a rehearing
of the case, the same result was ultimately reached again in Rennie II.59
The Rennie Process was utilized by New Jersey until it was sued by Disability
Rights New Jersey in 2012.60
In New Jersey, the Rennie Process was codified by New Jersey Depart-
ment of Human Services Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services
Rights, 796 F.3d at 309 (using Mathews to analyze procedural due process rights in
forced medication claim).
56. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).  Note that there are two Rennie cases because
the Supreme Court remanded the first case back to the Third Circuit for rehear-
ing. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 297 (discussing Rennie I and Rennie II).  The
Third Circuit does not consider that remanding of Rennie an instance in which the
Supreme Court directly addressed involuntary medication in the civil context be-
cause the Court simply vacated the decision and did not reverse it. See id. at
296–97.
57. 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Rennie II]; see also Disability Rights,
796 F.3d at 297 (discussing Rennie I and Rennie II).
58. See Rennie I, 653 F.2d at 854 (Seitz, J., concurring) (explaining that pa-
tients have qualified right to refuse medication).  The Rennie Process was the three-
step administrative process by which a patient could be forced to take antip-
sychotic medication. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 296–97. Disability Rights pro-
vides an overview of the Rennie Process:
(1) At the first level, when a patient refuses to accept medication, the
treating physician must explain to the patient the nature of his condition,
the rationale for using the particular drug, and the risks or benefits of it
as well as those of alternative treatments.  (2) If the patient still declines,
the matter is discussed at a meeting of the patient’s treatment team,
which is composed of the treating physician and other hospital person-
nel, such as psychologists, social workers, and nurses who have regular
contact with the patient.  The patient is to be present at this meeting if
his condition permits.  (3) If, after the team meeting, the impasse re-
mains, the medical director of the hospital or his designee must person-
ally examine the patient and review the record.  In the event the director
agrees with the physician’s assessment of the need for involuntary treat-
ment, medication may then be administered.  The medical director is
also authorized, but not required, to retain an independent psychiatrist
to evaluate the patient’s need for medication.  Finally, the director is re-
quired to make a weekly review of the treatment program of each patient
who is being drugged against his will to determine whether the compul-
sory treatment is still necessary.
Id. (quoting Rennie I, 653 F.2d at 848–49).
59. See Rennie II, 720 F.2d at 269 (holding patients can refuse forced medica-
tion unless they pose danger to themselves or others).
60. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 296, 298 (“New Jersey adopted Administra-
tive Bulletin 78-3, which became known as the ‘Rennie process. . . .’”).
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Administrative Bulletin 78-3 (AB 78-3).61  AB 78-3 implemented a three-
step process that required the following before a patient could be forcibly
medicated: (1) psych-education for the civil patient’s treating psychiatrist
or physician, (2) a treatment team meeting that discussed the possibility of
forced medication, and (3) an evaluation of the patient by the facility’s
medical director or designee.62  AB 78-3 was replaced in 2012 with the
more comprehensive policies described in Administrative Bulletin 5:04A
(AB 5:04A) and Administrative Bulletin 5:04B (AB 5:04B).63
Under the emergency provisions of AB 5:04A, a patient can be forci-
bly medicated for up to three days while imminently dangerous but must
be reassessed every twenty-four hours.64  Under the non-emergency provi-
sions of AB 5:04B, an involuntarily committed patient can be forcibly med-
icated only when the untreated mental illness poses a serious risk of harm
61. See id. at 296 (discussing adoption of AB 78-3).  AB 78-3 was only adopted
in response to the plaintiff’s suit in Rennie. See id. at 296 (describing adoption of
AB 78-3).  That codification and the change that came again in 2012 go to show
that to make a real change, all that often need to happen is to file suit and the
change will come even before the judgment is handed down. See generally id. at
296–98 (describing Rennie process and subsequent legislation).
62. See id. at 296–97 (discussing the procedure required under AB 78-3).
63. See id. at 298 (“In June 2012, while Disability Rights’ lawsuit remained
pending, the State replaced the Rennie process with two separate policies for forci-
ble treatment in emergencies (AB 5:04A) and nonemergent situations (AB
5:04B).”).  The “Policy” section of AB 5:04A states, “[a]ll patients must be given the
opportunity to consent to the administration of psychotropic medications and nec-
essary tests and co-medications.  In an emergency, as defined herein, any patient
regardless of legal status . . . may be given such treatment by following the proce-
dure herein.” DIVISION MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTION SERVS., N.J. DEP’T OF HUMAN
SERVS., ADMINISTRATIVE BULLETIN A.B. 5:04A: THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO THE
NECESSITY TO OBTAIN CONSENT TO TREATMENT WITH PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS
(June 4, 2012) [hereinafter A.B. 5:04A].  AB 5:04A then goes on to detail the pro-
cedure that must be met. See id. (describing treatment procedure).  The “Proce-
dure” section of AB 5:04B states,
In a non-emergency situation, when an involuntary patient . . . does not
provide or cannot provide consent to the proposed administration of
psychotropic medication after being given the opportunity to consent
pursuant to the informed consent policy, and the patient’s prescriber
documents that the patient has been diagnosed with a mental illness,
and, as a result of mental illness, poses a likelihood of serious harm to
self, others, or property without the medication, the treating prescriber
shall initiate the Involuntary Medication Procedure as follows, if he or she
has determined, after considering less restrictive interventions, that medi-
cation is appropriate[.]
DIVISION MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTION SERVS., N.J. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE BULLETIN A.B. 5:04B: THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO THE NECESSITY TO
OBTAIN CONSENT TO TREATMENT WITH PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS (June 4, 2012)
[hereinafter A.B. 5:04B].
64. See A.B. 5:04A(V)(C) (discussing procedure for emergency forced medica-
tion policy).  This section of the policy states: “[a]t least every 24 hours during the
72 hours, the nursing staff assigned to the patient shall document any effects of the
medication, both positive and negative . . . .” See id.
10
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to self, others, or property.65  AB 5:04B is more controversial than AB
5:04A because it addresses the forcible medication of patients in non-
emergency situations, i.e., situations where the patient did not pose an
imminent threat to safety.66  AB 5:04B also details a number of steps for an
administrative hearing process before the medication can be involuntarily
administered.67  These steps include: (1) submission of a medical report
65. See A.B. 5:04B(I)(A)(1) (stating 5:04B applies where mental health pa-
tient “poses a likelihood of serious harm to self, others, or property if psychotropic
medication is not administered”).
66. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 298–99 (discussing details of New Jersey
administrative bulletins 5:04A and 5:04B).  The fact that Disability Rights New
Jersey was only challenging AB 5:04B shows that it was the more controversial ad-
ministrative bulletin. See id. (describing stringent requirements of 5:04B).
67. See id. at 298–99 (discussing AB 5:04B).  Because the exact policy is
lengthy, the court in Disability Rights provided a succinct summary of it:
First, the patient’s treating physician must complete an involuntary medi-
cation administration report, which documents the patient’s diagnosis,
the medication and dosage contemplated, the rationale for concluding
that the patient satisfies the substantive standard outlined above, the less
restrictive alternatives considered and rejected, the efforts made to ex-
plain to the patient the need for medication, and any objections ex-
pressed by the patient.  Next, the hospital’s medical director appoints a
three-person panel chaired by a psychiatrist who may be a hospital em-
ployee but who may not be currently involved in the patient’s treatment.
The other members of the panel must be a hospital administrator and a
clinician, neither of whom may be currently involved in the patient’s
treatment.
At a medication review hearing held on the patient’s ward within five days
of the involuntary medication administration report being submitted to
the medical director, the panel hears evidence to determine whether to
approve involuntary medication.  The patient has the right to be notified
of the hearing, attend the hearing, testify, present evidence and wit-
nesses, cross-examine witnesses, and have a mental health professional or
legal counsel present (at the patient’s expense).  The patient is also af-
forded the assistance of the hospital’s client services advocate, a psychiat-
ric nurse who consults with the patient and assists him in presenting
evidence and making objections at the hearing.  After the hearing, invol-
untary medication will be authorized only if the chair and at least one
other member of the panel agree that the substantive standard is satis-
fied.  The patient has 24 hours to appeal the panel’s decision to the medi-
cal director, and administration of the medication can begin immediately
if the panel’s decision is affirmed.  Any further appeal must be made to
the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court.
The initial approval of forcible medication is valid for 14 days.  Within 12
days of that approval, the treating psychiatrist must report on the pa-
tient’s positive and negative responses to the medication, what less restric-
tive interventions have been attempted or ruled out, and whether the
patient is continuing to withhold consent.  A panel—which need not
comprise the same people as before—may then authorize forcible medi-
cation lasting up to 90 days.  Throughout that period, the treating pre-
scriber must submit biweekly reports to the medical director detailing the
patient’s progress.  If, at the end of 90 days, the patient still does not
consent to medication, the hospital must start the entire process over
again in order to continue the forcible medication.
11
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by the patient’s psychiatrist, (2) a review of the report by a medical panel,
(3) the right of the patient to testify and call witnesses at a hearing held by
the panel, and (4) the patient’s right to appeal the panel’s decision to
forcibly medicate to a New Jersey state court.68
III. CAREFUL WITH THAT NEEDLE, NEW JERSEY: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
ADDRESSES DISABILITY RIGHTS
When New Jersey’s forced medication policy changed after nearly
thirty years in 2012, Disability Rights New Jersey still was not satisfied.69
Under the revised policy, even the sanest and least dangerous of New
Jersey’s psychiatric patients could still be forcibly medicated.70  Contrary
to Nurse Ratched’s advice, Disability Rights New Jersey would not go on
with its daily routine.71
A. Mother, Should I Trust the Government? Facts and Procedure
of Disability Rights
Disability Rights New Jersey is a nonprofit, government-funded organ-
ization that was formed in 1994 to advocate for citizens with disabilities.72
In August 2010, Disability Rights New Jersey filed suit against the New
Jersey Department of Human Services in the United States District Court
of the District of New Jersey claiming the Rennie Process violated provi-
sions of the United States Constitution, Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.73  Disability Rights New Jersey
asked for declaratory and injunctive relief that would invalidate the Rennie
Process as a whole and requested that any new procedure require the state
Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
68. See id. (discussing AB 5:04A and AB 5:04B). See generally Roy F. Harmon &
A.G. Harmon, Weight Medical Judgments: Explaining Evidentiary Preferences for Treating
Physician Opinions in ERISA Cases After Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 13
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 157, 157–58 (2009) (discussing correct evidentiary
weight that should be afforded to medical opinions).
69. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 299 (“New Jersey’s replacement of the Ren-
nie process with the Policy did not resolve the litigation because the Policy did not
go as far as Disability Rights requested in its complaint.”).
70. See generally A.B. 5:04A(I)–(VII) (allowing New Jersey psychiatric facilities
to forcibly medicate CEPP patients).
71. See ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST (Fantasy Films 1975).  Nurse
Ratched, the film’s famous villain, at one point attempts to calm a crowd of angry
patients who gathered to protest her involvement in another patient’s suicide. See
id. (depicting scene in film).  In attempt to calm the crowd, Nurse Ratched says,
“[n]ow calm down.  The best thing we can do is go on with our daily routine.” Id.
72. See About DRNJ, DISABILITY RIGHTS N.J., http://www.drnj.org/aboutdrnj
.htm [https://perma.cc/4G5E-9RDP] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) (explaining
DRNJ’s mission).  More specifically, DRNJ has nine federally funded programs,
including the program “Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Ill-
ness.” See id.  DRNJ is funded principally by the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, the Department of Education, and the Social Security
Administration. See id.
73. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 297 (discussing procedural posture).
12
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to provide judicial hearings before patients could be medicated in non-
emergency situations.74  New Jersey immediately moved to dismiss Disabil-
ity Rights New Jersey’s assertions by arguing that the Rennie cases strictly
precluded such claims.75  But the district court refused the state’s request
based on Rennie I and the Court’s decision in Harper.76  In March 2012,
New Jersey moved to vacate, which the court granted.77
As previously mentioned, just a few months after its motion to vacate
was granted, New Jersey revised its forcible medication policy by replacing
the Rennie Process with AB 5:04A and AB 5:04B.78  Still, the replacement
did not go as far as Disability Rights wanted because the new policy did not
“require premedication judicial process, a ‘clear and convincing’ showing
of incompetence, a right to counsel in medication review proceedings, or
a right to appointed experts.”79  Specifically, Disability Rights New Jersey
challenged AB 5:04B’s medication of patients in non-emergency situa-
tions, claiming that it allowed the state to discriminate based on mental
health status and to forcibly medicate certain citizens without the process
74. See id. (discussing relief requested by plaintiffs).  The DRNJ complaint ac-
tually asked for more than just a judicial hearing in such non-emergency situa-
tions. See id.  It also requested
a requirement that nonemergent forcible medication take place only af-
ter a finding that the patient is incompetent to make medical decisions; a
right to counsel at the hearing; establishment of a system of  “exper-
ienced and knowledgeable” counsel to advocate for patients’ interests; a
right to have independent expert witnesses appointed; imposition of a
“clear and convincing evidence” burden of proof in forcible medication
proceedings; assurance that hospital staff would be properly trained in
the administration of psychotropic drugs; and a requirement that the
State report monthly to Disability Rights on its use of psychotropic medi-
cation in psychiatric hospitals.
Id.  These were essentially all the due process requests that New Jersey adopted
when it replaced the Rennie Process with 5:04A and 5:04B in 2012. See id. at
298–300.
75. See id. at 298 (discussing New Jersey’s argument that cited the Third Cir-
cuit’s Rennie decision).
76. See id. (addressing district court’s treatment of New Jersey’s argument).
With regards to Rennie I, the court stated that case “specifically held that the invol-
untarily committed patients were to be accorded no fewer constitutional protec-
tions than prisoners.” See id. (quoting Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Valez, Civ. No.
10-3950(DRD), 2011 WL 2976849, at *9 (D.N.J. July 20, 2011)).  When it came to
denying the motion based on Harper, the court stated that case stood for the pro-
position that “mentally ill prisoners facing forcible medication were entitled to
procedural protections that ‘dwarf[ed]’ what the Rennie process provided.” See id.
at 298 (quoting Disability Rights, 2011 WL 29676849, at *10).
77. See id. (discussing district court’s grant of motion to vacate).
78. See id. (discussing New Jersey’s adoption of new forced medication pol-
icy).
79. See id. at 299 (discussing Disability Rights’ issues with revised New Jersey
policy).
13
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they were entitled to.80  Both parties then filed for summary judgment.81
The district court held that the revised New Jersey policies withstood all of
Disability Rights New Jersey’s claims, except when it came to the forcible
medication of patients with CEPP status.82  The district court upheld the
policy as it pertained to non-CEPP patients because the policy was a “legiti-
mate safety requirement” and because the discrimination in the policy was
not based on disability but on “a finding of dangerousness.”83  When it
came to CEPP patients, however, the policy did not pass muster because
those patients were “found by a court of law not to be dangerous” and that
any “relapse into dangerousness” could easily be handled by AB 5:04A’s
emergency provision.84  Unsatisfied with the judgment, Disability Rights
New Jersey appealed the decision to uphold the process with respect to
non-CEPP patients to the Third Circuit.85
B. Hey! Doctor! Leave Them CEPP Patients Alone! The Third Circuit’s
Analysis in Disability Rights
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s judgment.86
In doing so, the court first addressed one of the most important questions:
whether the New Jersey policy was discriminatory within the framework of
the ADA.87  The court answered that question negatively and held that the
“fatal defect” in Disability Rights’ ADA claim was that the right to judicial
process before medication is forcibly administered “does not exist in New
Jersey for nondisabled people.”88  To the court, this showed that a denial
80. See id. (discussing Disability Rights New Jersey’s argument with respect to
AB 5:04B).  Disability Rights did not challenge the AB 5:04A policy that “a patient
who ‘presents a risk of imminent or reasonably impending harm or danger to self
or others’ can be forcibly medicated for up to 72 hours unless a less restrictive
alternative method is available.” See id. at 298.  Perhaps that was in part due to the
necessary safety measures it imposes, or perhaps it was because patients subject to
forced medication under AB 5:04A must be reassessed every twenty-four hours af-
ter that initial seventy-two-hour period “to determine whether the emergency per-
sists.” See id.
81. See id. at 299 (stating “the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment”).
82. See id. at 300 (discussing district court’s holding and reasoning).
83. See id. (quoting Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Velez, 974 F. Supp. 2d 705,
739 (D.N.J. 2013)).
84. See id. (discussing district court’s holding that deferred to AB 5:04A).
85. See id. at 299–300 (discussing Disability Rights New Jersey’s appeal that
claimed New Jersey’s new policy still did not provide sufficient due process).
86. See id. at 310 (“We therefore affirm the District Court’s summary judg-
ment for Disability Rights on the due process claim with respect to CEPP
patients.”).
87. See id. at 301–02 (explaining that ADA claim requires that “public entity”
that provides benefits may not exclude disabled individual from receiving same
benefits).
88. See id. at 304 (explaining that Disability Rights New Jersey argued that
right to refuse medication is “benefit” being denied to plaintiffs).
14
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of such a right for mentally disabled patients is not discriminatory.89
Though it was true that people are entitled to judicial process before be-
ing committed, there is no premedication judicial process for anyone in
New Jersey.90  Disability Rights New Jersey’s ADA claim did not allege that
disabled people were “denied some [service, program, activity, or] benefit
that a public entity [had] extended to nondisabled people.”91  Therefore,
the policy withstood the ADA claim.92
The court then turned to Disability Rights New Jersey’s due process
claims with a particular focus on its procedural due process claims.93  Be-
cause the New Jersey policy addressed both non-CEPP and CEPP patients,
89. See id. (discussing merits of ADA claim).  Title II of the ADA states, “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activi-
ties of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”  42
U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).  However, states do not have to comply with all ADA provi-
sions if a disabled person “pose[s] a ‘direct threat’ to others, as long as the States
make these determinations using comprehensive ‘individualized assessment[s].’”
See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 301 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b) (2017)).
90. See id. at 304 (noting that Disability Rights New Jersey conceded as much
in its brief).
91. See id. at 306 (discussing Disability Rights New Jersey’s inability to establish
prima facie case for ADA claim).  To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a
plaintiff “must show that he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; that he was
excluded from a service, program, or activity of a public entity; and that he was
excluded because of his disability.” See id. at 301.
92. See id. at 307 (“[W]e hold that Disability Rights has failed to allege a prima
facie violation of Title II of the ADA . . . .”).  The court talked at length about
Disability Rights New Jersey’s inability to identify the exact “service, program, or
activity” mental health patients were not being offered by the State. See id. at
301–07.  At oral argument, Disability Rights New Jersey argued that the service or
program not offered to psychiatric patients was “the right to judicial process before
being administered medication in nonemergent situations.” See id. at 302.  How-
ever, in its brief to the court, it also referred to the service or program as “the right
to refuse medical treatment.” See id.  The court did not take this betrayal of “con-
siderable confusion over the nature of the service, program, or activity in question”
lightly. See id. at 302.  After discussing the numerous contradictory statements Dis-
ability Rights New Jersey made on the subject, the court concluded that the service,
program, or activity in question was the right to judicial process before being forci-
bly medicated. See id. at 303.  In doing so, the court stated:
Here, there is no debate that the remedy demanded by Disability Rights is
an order requiring New Jersey to provide judicial hearings (and associ-
ated procedural protections) prior to nonemergent forcible medication.
Where, as here, a party clearly articulates the remedy sought but offers
shifting or perhaps ambiguous indications as to the corresponding ser-
vice, program, or activity, we can (and should) infer from that remedy the
true identity of the service, program, or activity.  The undisputed fact that
Disability Rights seeks only a procedural remedy is thus compelling evi-
dence that the service, program, or activity is procedural too.
Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
93. See id. at 307 (“Having rejected Disability Rights’ statutory claims, we turn
now to its constitutional claims.  The District Court split its analysis of the due
process claim into substantive and procedural components, but we focus on proce-
dural due process.”).
15
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the court broke up its due process analysis into two parts, discussing the
implications for the non-CEPP patients first.94  To the judges on the
panel, the policy at issue in Harper was virtually identical to the New Jersey
policy at hand.95  As such, the panel relied on the precedent Harper estab-
lished and the test the Supreme Court relied on in that case: the Mathews
balancing test.96  Recall the Mathews test requires that a court considering
procedural due process claims on forcible medication balance the pa-
tient’s interest in avoiding unwanted medication with the state’s interest in
safety in security.97  In Harper, the plaintiff’s claim was rejected under Ma-
thews because his interests did not outweigh state’s interests.98  Moreover,
the Harper Court emphasized that “[t]he risks associated with antip-
sychotic drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by medical
professionals.”99  With regards to Disability Rights New Jersey’s claim con-
cerning AB 5:04A and non-CEPP patients, the Third Circuit applied the
same test and line of reasoning concerning medical opinions and rejected
the due process claims concerning those patients.100
Next, the court analyzed the issue of forcibly medicating CEPP pa-
tients.101  The court found that, because CEPP patients have already been
adjudged not dangerous by a court of law, Harper did not apply.102  Be-
cause Harper did not apply, the court leaned heavily on the Mathews bal-
ancing test and considered: (1) the affected private interest, (2) “the risk
94. See id. (“Because the due process analysis is different for non-CEPP and
CEPP patients, we evaluate them separately.”).
95. See id. (“As Disability Rights admits, New Jersey’s Policy is essentially identi-
cal to the Washington policy at issue in Harper, which required approval of forcible
medication by a three-person committee accompanied by various other procedural
protections.” (citation omitted)).
96. See id. (relying on Harper precedent to identify proper due process analysis
to apply); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 228 (1990) (utilizing Ma-
thews balancing test).
97. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 307–08 (discussing Mathews balancing test
in context of Harper decision).
98. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 236 (“[W]e hold that the [Washington state policy]
is permissible under the Constitution.  It is an accommodation between an in-
mate’s liberty interest in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs
and the State’s interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the
danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to him-
self or others.”).
99. See id. at 231, 233 (“[W]e conclude that an inmate’s interests are ade-
quately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate
to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge.”).
100. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 307–09 (discussing Harper and agreeing
with its application of Mathews and opinion regarding expertise of medical profes-
sionals in adjudging whether to forcibly medicate mentally ill patients).
101. See id. at 309–10 (discussing constitutional claims pertaining to forced
medication of CEPP patients).
102. See id. at 309 (“Disability Rights is correct that Harper . . . does not control
with respect to CEPP patients.”).  The court’s rationale in this respect was that
prisoners, as the plaintiff was in Harper, are not adjudged by a court of law as “not
dangerous,” as civil CEPP patients are. See id.
16
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of an erroneous deprivation of such interest” if the policy was carried out
as proscribed, and (3) the government’s interest.103  First, the Third Cir-
cuit agreed with the district court that the civil patient’s interest in avoid-
ing the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs is significant,
especially “when a court of law has already declared [the patient] fit to
return to life in the community.”104  Next, the court found the risk of
erroneous results was high because allowing hospitals to decide to forcibly
medicate CEPP patients would allow doctors to easily overrule any judicial
determination that the patients were no longer dangerous.105  Last, the
government’s interest in forcibly medicating CEPP patients was “slight”
because the AB 5:04A emergency policy already accounted for the scena-
rio when CEPP patients relapsed into dangerousness.106  In addition to its
conclusions on those factors, the court also found that any “‘fiscal or ad-
ministrative burden’ imposed on New Jersey by a judicial hearing require-
ment for CEPP patients would be light.”107  For these reasons, the court
held the New Jersey policy of forcibly medicating non-dangerous, CEPP
patients was unconstitutional.108
103. See id. (applying Mathews balancing test (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976))).
104. See id. (applying first prong of Mathews and agreeing with district court).
Analyzing the first prong of Mathews, the court stated: “Psychotropic medication
alters and regulates the patient’s cognitive processes and can trigger serious side
effects.  A patient’s interest in avoiding such an invasion of his bodily integrity can
only be greater when a court of law has already declared him fit to return to life in
the community.” See id. (citation omitted).
105. See id. (applying second prong of Mathews balancing test).  The court
stated:
When New Jersey applies the Policy to a CEPP patient, it effectively va-
cates a court’s prior determination that the patient is not dangerous.
Such a decision may be appropriate in some circumstances—CEPP pa-
tients are only entitled to judicial review hearings every six months after
their first 60 days on CEPP status, so they have plenty of time in State
custody in which to relapse into dangerousness.  But allowing the Policy
to be applied to CEPP patients would permit the State to forcibly medi-
cate a patient just a few days after a judge has deemed the patient no
longer dangerous.
Id. (citation omitted).
106. See id. at 309 (characterizing New Jersey’s interest in AB 5:04B as
“slight”).
107. See id. at 309–10 (discussing and applying third prong of Mathews balanc-
ing test (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335)).  During trial, the State of New Jersey
admitted that it “ ‘very rarely’ sought to forcibly medicate CEPP patients pursuant
to [its policy].” See id. at 309.  It further admitted that “providing judicial process
for all psychiatric patients would result in just a five-percent increase in hearings,”
which the court interpreted as evidence of a miniscule financial burden on the
State if it provided such hearings for CEPP patients alone. See id. at 309–10.
108. See id. at 310 (finding New Jersey policy unconstitutional on issue of for-
cibly medicating CEPP patients).
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IV. THE DIVISION BELL: ADDRESSING FORCIBLE MEDICATION CLAIMS IN
THE THIRD CIRCUIT POST-DISABILITY RIGHTS
The Third Circuit’s holding in Disability Rights indicates one overarch-
ing principle: deference to the opinions of medical experts on medical
issues.109  Though this deference was not an original pillar of the Third
Circuit’s reasoning, the Third Circuit chose to adopt it for the same rea-
sons the Supreme Court did in Harper.110  In Harper, the Supreme Court
rejected “the notion that forcible medication decisions had to be made by
judges rather than medical professionals.”111  This was because “[t]he
risks associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the most part medical
109. See id. at 310 (looking to Harper for justification that “it is less than crystal
clear why lawyers must be available to identify possible errors in medical judgment”
(quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990))).  In the court’s opin-
ion, there were experts on nearly every subject, and there is no one better than
mental health professionals when it comes to medicating the mentally ill. See id.
The court was reluctant to insert a judge’s opinion in a matter where the opinion
was best left to the professional of that field. See id. (“New Jersey determined that,
while judges have an important role to play in the civil commitment process, mat-
ters of medical treatment are more appropriately handled by medical profession-
als.”).  This was especially true because, as the court pointed out, judges are
already involved in the civil commitment process when deciding to commit pa-
tients and, potentially, if the patients appeal their forcible medication order to a
state court. See id. at 299.
110. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 231, 236 (discussing need to defer to medical
judgment); see also Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 310 (discussing deference to medi-
cal opinions over judicial opinions).  Both the Supreme Court in Harper and the
Third Circuit in Disability Rights emphasized the patient’s interest in having deci-
sions to forcibly medicate be made by medical professionals rather than judges.
See Harper, 494 U.S. at 231 (discussing importance of decisions by medical profes-
sionals); see also Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 310 (refusing to substitute judicial
opinions for medical diagnoses).  In Disability Rights, the Third Circuit put it this
way:
We note that Disability Rights would have us unravel a policy that may
well be equal or superior to the judicial model it demands.  The State
asserts that the Policy was developed at least in part with bona fide con-
cerns for patient welfare in mind.  Disability Rights has not produced any
evidence that judicial hearings would more effectively prevent unneces-
sary medication than the Policy—for example, it has not shown that psy-
chiatric patients are medicated with appreciably less frequency in States
that do provide judicial process.  While it urges us to extend the coverage
of Title II beyond what the statute will bear, Disability Rights also fails to
show that invalidating the Policy would actually serve the interests of psy-
chiatric patients in New Jersey.
Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 306–07 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
111. See id. at 308 (discussing Harper Court’s rejection of injecting judicial de-
cision making into all medical decisions).  One area of the Harper opinion in which
the Court assented to the opinions of medical professionals came when the Court
stated, “[n]otwithstanding the risks that are involved, we conclude that an inmate’s
interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the deci-
sion to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge.” Harper,
494 U.S. at 231.
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ones, best assessed by medical professionals.”112  Similarly, the Third Cir-
cuit conformed to New Jersey’s rationale for its forcible medication policy,
which maintained that while judges are important to the civil commitment
process, decisions to medicate and other aspects of medical treatment are
decisions that are best left to medical professionals.113  Ultimately, the
adoption of this rationale in the Third Circuit proves to be a positive for
medical practitioners and their attorneys, while it will likely make claims
similar to those advanced by Disability Rights New Jersey tougher for advo-
cates for those with mental or intellectual disabilities to assert.114
A. Waiting for Someone or Something to Show You the Way: Advice for
Medical Practitioners and Their Attorneys
The response from mental health practitioners to Disability Rights has
been favorable.115  There were two key concepts—one legal and the other
practical—that arose from Disability Rights that attorneys for medical prac-
titioners should assert if they find themselves arguing a due process case in
the medical sphere.116  Legally, Disability Rights allows doctors to imple-
ment health procedures that are necessary to keep the patient and others
112. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 308  (discussing how deference to medi-
cal opinions rather than judicial ones is in best interest of mentally-ill prisoner
(quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 233)).  “A State may conclude with good reason that a
judicial hearing will not be as effective, as continuous, or as probing as administra-
tive review using medical decisionmakers.” Id.
113. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 310 (“New Jersey determined that, while
judges have an important role to play in the civil commitment process, matters of
medical treatment are more appropriately handled by medical professionals.”).
114. See id. at 306–10 (adopting general deference to medical opinions in due
process claims pertaining to involuntary medication of mentally ill).
115. See Ali & Weiss, supra note 17, at 261 (“We agree that the court’s
nuanced reasoning will advance these adjudications.”).  More generally, many
mental health professionals agree that involuntary commitment and sometimes
involuntary medication are necessary because “patients may recognize their symp-
toms as part of an illness, but disagree with and refuse recommended treat-
ment[,]” which could cause them to harm themselves or others. See Menninger,
supra note 41 (explaining why involuntary hospitalization is necessary in some in-
stances).  Menninger goes on to write:
“Untreated depression, mania, and psychosis can have devastating effects
on both the affected individual and those around him or her: suicide,
assaults on others, inadvertent tragedies stemming from delusional think-
ing, financial and social ruin, and inability to adequately care for one’s
own needs.  Because insight often is lacking, civil commitment may be
initiated by others who witness or are the brunt of concerning behavior,
whether they be family members, police, or mental health providers.
Id.  Though Menninger’s words were written long before Disability Rights, they offer
support from the medical community that the Third Circuit’s deference to medi-
cal opinions on issues of mental health is warranted. See id. (discussing medical
and legal basis for involuntary treatment).
116. See generally Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 300 (discussing need for state
policy to serve “legitimate safety requirement” and need to defer to medical opin-
ions on medical matters (quoting Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Velez, 974 F. Supp.
2d 705, 739 (D.N.J. 2013))).
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safe.117  This is demonstrated by the court’s affirmation of the New Jersey
policy as it pertained to legally-dangerous, non-CEPP patients.118  This,
however, is not novel; the Supreme Court has long held that safety of the
general public necessitates what would otherwise be considered an in-
fringement on citizens’ constitutional rights.119
Nevertheless, Disability Rights does more than simply provide a Third
Circuit case that embodies that legal principal.120  As a practical matter,
Disability Rights provides attorneys representing medical practitioners with
concrete support for the assertion that judges should not substitute their
own judgment for that of medical professionals when it comes to medical
issues.121  This is an assertion that the medical community has highlighted
and looked upon favorably since this case was decided in 2015 because it
provides medical organizations with comprehensive authority to promul-
gate rules and regulations so long as they are related to public health and
safety.122  Accordingly, attorneys for medical practitioners should assert
Disability Rights and its findings on a broad basis when they are arguing
judges should defer to their client’s judgment.123
B. What Have We Found? The Same Old Fears: Advice for Patients’ Attorneys
Historically, courts have given general deference to the opinions of
medical professionals.124 Disability Rights embodies specific precedent for
medical practitioners in the Third Circuit to assert that notion.125  Still, an
117. See id. at 308 (“[F]orced administration of psychotropic drugs can be
used only for safety and treatment reasons . . . .”).
118. See id. (“affirm[ing] the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of
New Jersey on the due process claim with respect to non-CEPP patients”).
119. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990) (finding plaintiff’s
interests could be outweighed by Washington’s interest in safety and security).
120. See generally Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 306–10 (discussing New Jersey’s
rationale for adopting forcible medication policy and reinforcing deference to
medical opinions).
121. See id. at 310 (“New Jersey determined that, while judges have an impor-
tant role to play in the civil commitment process, matters of medical treatment are
more appropriately handled by medical professionals.”).
122. See, e.g., Ali & Weiss, supra note 17, at 259–61 (agreeing with findings of
Disability Rights); see also Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 308 (discussing state’s interests
in safety regarding forcible medication policies).
123. See generally Ali & Weiss, supra note 17, at 260–61 (agreeing with Third
Circuit’s emphasis in Disability Rights on deference to medical opinions).
124. See Harmon & Harmon, supra note 68, at 157–58 (2009) (discussing judi-
cial deference to opinions of medical professionals).  As Roy and A.G. Harmon
point out, “[o]ne of the more significant examples is the rule favoring the testi-
mony of treating physicians in Social Security disability cases.  By regulation, the
Social Security Administration regards treating physicians’ opinions as providing a
‘detailed, longitudinal picture’ of impairment inaccessible from other sources,
such as objective medical findings standing alone.” See id. at 158 (footnotes
omitted).
125. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 306–10 (granting general deference to
opinions of medical professionals on medical issues).
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attorney defending a patient’s due process claim can use Disability Rights
advantageously by arguing that it narrowly applies to forcible medication
cases involving policies the same as or largely similar to New Jersey’s.126
First, AB 5:04A and AB 5:04B were very comprehensive in that there were
a number of steps and safeguards in place to reduce the likelihood of
physicians’ mistakes throughout the process of determining whether or
not a patient needed to be forcibly medicated.127  A patient’s attorney can
argue that Disability Rights does not apply because the policy that his or her
client is challenging is not as broad as New Jersey’s.128  Second, in its con-
clusion, the court simply stated, “the State’s approach comports with the
demands of the Constitution and the [ADA], except as to CEPP pa-
tients.”129  The court specified that New Jersey’s approach was partially ade-
quate, but the court did not say that any or all policies that aim to forcibly
medicate non-CEPP patients would be constitutional.130  The court’s lan-
guage is evidence that Disability Rights should only apply to New Jersey’s
policy or policies the same or largely similar to it.131  In another context,
Disability Rights held that only patients whom were found to be dangerous
could be forcibly medicated.132  If attorneys can certify that their client is
not legally dangerous, then any state measure that infringes on the client’s
due process rights will not stand up to Disability Rights’ scrutiny even if the
state argues that its policy is justified for safety reasons.133
V. CONCLUSION: HIGH HOPES FOR THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW
For medical practitioners and their attorneys, Disability Rights is a
favorable case because it emphasizes deference to medical opinions on
medical matters.134  Meanwhile, for patients and their attorneys, Disability
Rights does not provide much substantive law to utilize in their favor.135
Still, this case demonstrates that, while mental health professionals pro-
vide valued insight and opinions for the formation of mental health law,
they do not have unlimited authority to promulgate forcible medication
126. For support of this assertion, see supra notes 62–68 and accompanying
text, and see infra notes 127–33 and accompanying text.
127. For discussion on AB 5:04A and AB 5:04B, see supra notes 62–68 and
accompanying text.
128. For discussion on AB 5:04A and AB 5:04B, see supra notes 62–68 and
accompanying text.
129. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 310 (finding New Jersey’s plan comported
with Constitution, “except as to CEPP patients”).
130. See id. (finding New Jersey’s policy partially complied with Constitution).
131. For further discussion, see supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
132. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 307–08, 310 (finding non-CEPP patients
can be forcibly medicated under AB 5:04A).
133. See id. at 309–10 (determining patients found not dangerous as matter of
law cannot be forcibly medicated without judicial process).
134. For further discussion on the Third Circuit’s deference to medical opin-
ions, see supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion on Disability Rights’ impact on patients and their attor-
neys, see supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text.
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policies.136  For that reason, Disability Rights is a positive step for mental
health law reform in the United States, no matter if viewed from the per-
spective of a medical practitioner or from that of a mental health
patient.137
136. See Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 307–10 (finding New Jersey’s forcible
medication law is only partially constitutional).
137. For further discussion and support, see supra notes 109–33 and accompa-
nying text.
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